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…any theory not founded on the nature of being human is a lie and a betrayal of [hu]man[ity]. An inhuman theory 
will inevitably lead to human consequences--if the therapist is consistent. Fortunately, many therapists have the gift 
of inconsistency. This, however endearing, cannot be regarded as ideal. (Laing, 1967, p.31). 
... coming to see other human beings as 'one of us' rather than as 'them' is a matter of detailed description of what 
unfamiliar people are like and of redescription of what we ourselves are like. (Rorty, 1989,p. xvi). 
Introduction 
In 1974, Heinz von Foerster initiated a quantum leap in cybernetic thinking. Following a lecture by Margaret Mead 
(1968), who suggested that cybeneticians apply the principles of cybernetics to themselves, Foerster distinguished between 
the then prevailing cybernetics of observed systems--the cybernetics of Norbert Wiener and Ross Ashby--and the 
cybernetics of observing (systems). This posed new questions and opened an area of inquiry variously called cybernetics 
of cybernetics or second-order cybernetics. To me, the shift from a first-order to a second-order cybernetics signaled a shift 
in scientific attitude toward reality, from privileging the perspectives of detached observers, spectators or engineers of a 
world outside of themselves to acknowledging our own participation in the world we observe and construct as its 
constituents. He also added to Humberto Maturana's (1970) proposition: 'anything said is said by an observer,' one of his 
own: 'anything said is said to an observer' (Foerster, 1979) (my emphasis) thus highlighting the fact that observational 
accounts are constructed in language and for people capable of observation. 
In this essay I want to take seriously the notion that communication involves people--not only as participants, as speakers 
and listeners, for example, but also as observers of their own participation in that process. This includes observing 
http://www.asc.upenn.edu/usr/krippendorff/SECORDER.html (1 of 22) [3/7/2008 12:32:15 PM]
Systems Research Vol
other communicators as well. Participating in communication is primary. Without language, however, this participation has 
no discernible structure. It is in the speaking of communication that the practices being observed and talked of 
become communication and that its participants commit themselves to being in it. Speaking of communication 
is communication of communication and second-order by comparison, for it already presupposes one's 
communicative involvements. Communication, defined by and embodied in those speaking of it, thus becomes a 
fundamentally local and self-referential phenomenon. Indeed, what communication is or entails varies widely from one 
culture to another. Even in our own, explaining practices of living in terms of communication is a surprisingly recent 
invention and, in fact, a continuously evolving one. The very practice of writing scholarly essays on communication attests 
to my claim that nothing is ever entirely settled. 
(Re)conceptualizing communication, talking or writing of communication, that is, communication of communication, is 
what we communication scholars do. The fact that communication scholars must actually do what they inquire into and talk 
of is unique to this kind of scholarship and calls for including themselves in their own domain of inquiry. When one wants 
to take theories as plausible accounts of particular practices, then communication theories can not exclude 
scholarly communication practices, among which is the creation and dissemination of theories. Consequently, 
communication theories must be applicable to themselves. This is not a trivial matter as will become apparent below. 
Although social scientists communicate in numerous ways--interviewing their subjects, engaging discursively with 
colleagues, publishing their work, self-applications of communication theories are surprisingly rare if not totally absent 
from the literature. It is as if the communicative involvements of scientists were immune to critical examination or so 
perfectly obvious as to be not worthy of attention. This schism easily leads to theories that people find hard to live by. I 
know of no communication scholar who could communicate by the protocols of the classical theories they tend to perfect 
with their colleagues, for example, of communication as attitude change, as information transmission, as prediction and 
control, as management of meanings, or as institutionalized mass-production of messages. Communication, the way we 
engage in it, seems not the way we say it is. This essay, for instance, does not intend to change readers' affective evaluation 
of something they already know, nor to impart information that this writer has, but readers don't. One of my aims is to show 
the seriousness of not realizing that we live in communication while theorizing it. 
All theories reside in talk and in publications. They may be difficult to understand by some, but they also can become 
quite popular, and end up transforming existing practices. This can happen to theories in physics as well as in 
sociology. However, social theories are not only created by people who claim to understand what they are saying; they 
are above all about people and may become understood by the very people of which these theories speak. When this 
happens, social theories can be said to re-enter the very practices they claim to describe and change their truths right in front 
of the theorists' eyes. Figure I  
attempts to depict this recursion.  
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Figure 1 Re-entry of social theories
 
The paths along which theories are allowed to travel and re-enter demarcate disciplinary boundaries. The natural sciences, 
for example, have conveniently defined themselves as well as their objects so as to exclude re-entry problems. Matter 
is conceived not to understand theories of it, and naturalist methods of observation do not allow scientific observers to 
enter their own domain of observation. 'Objectivity', which von Foerster (1995) so aptly called 'the illusion that reality could 
be observed without an observer', still dominates much of scientific methodology. Under this illusion, scientific observers 
see themselves as occupying places that are very different from the objects they theorize. 
When social theories re-enter the practices they describe through the people that engage them, they affect these practices, 
for example, by legitimizing them, by reconceptualizing them in scientific terms, or by stopping them altogether. Indeed, 
upon re-entry, social theories behave more like self-fulfilling prophesies (Merton, 1963; Watzlawick, 1984) than as 
statements of objective or observer-independent facts--regardless of their theorists' intentions. One well-documented 
example of re-entry is described in Robert Rosenthal et al. (1968) study of classrooms where teachers were given 
arbitrary intelligence scores of their students who ended up testing that way. We know that the majority of women who 
grow up in narratives of their inferiority quite naturally end up in subservient positions. We know of psychiatrists' inclination 
to talk patients into the very psychopathologies they are experts in treating. We know of how theories (or should I say 
myths) of communication drive teaching practices, therapies, self-improvement movements/courses, literature, 
international relations, and above all communication technologies. Social theories are thus changing the very social world 
that give rise to them. The injunction against observers entering their domain of observation is a positivist attempt to 
keep theories from becoming self-fulfilling, hold on to a representational notion of truth, dissociate theorists from 
the consequences of their theories and preserve the monologic of scientific communication, leaving no opening for the 
voices of human subjects to be heard. In the social domain, this injunction is unwarranted. This is so not only because 
it contradicts the facts of re-entry, but also because it gives social scientists the convenient excuse for denying 
their responsibility for the consequences of intervening into their domain of inquiry. Acknowledging this responsibility 
leads me to see social scholarly pursuits as relational practices (see Gergen, 1994). 
Concerning such practices, let me add a contention that is central to this essay: whenever we abstract social theories from 
their primary settings (of people, situations, individuals or institutional practices) and communicate them as valid accounts 
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of social phenomena, we, as social scientists, invariably designate places for other people to occupy. How we conceive 
or speak of these Others, even when we omit explicit references to them, always directs our listening, our (re)searching, 
and our interacting with these unnamed and possibly unknown Others. Moreover, when we publish scientific theories 
of communication, we speak in our capacity as communication scholars and assume the authority to construct the otherness 
of Others. Whenever such theories re-enter peoples' lives, whenever they are talked of, re-articulated, and adopted as 
folk-theories, whenever they are realized and tested in practice, the particular spaces they offer for people to make their 
home in them and meet each Other, are likely influenced by the authority attributed to them. This demands of social theorists 
to assume a considerable responsibility. To criticize social theories for their political 'biases', for their lack of neutrality, 
is besides the point of finding a way of understanding them as communications. 
To gain a handle on these relational practices I will take to heart the existentialist distinction between two kinds of 
world constructions: one where people see themselves surrounded by tangible objects that they need to manipulate to 
achieve their own ends; and the other where people see themselves related to other fellow human beings, much like 
themselves and with whom they appreciate being for whatever reasons. Martin Buber (1958, 1970; Horwitz, 1978) calls 
these the I-it and I-Thou relation, respectively. At least one study generated convincing data concerning the reality of 
this distinction (Roberts, 1985). I am not an existentialist, however, nor am I satisfied with the binary nature of his 
distinction and the contrast between the instrumental, rational and non-instrumental-intuitive ways of knowing it 
suggests. However, to retain the notion that selves and Others are constructed relationally, in communication with each 
Other, I will expand Buber's distinction to several I-Other relations. After all, English has several pronouns to refer to 
people, in singular and plural, in first, second and third person terms, and these provide us a natural way of bringing 
relational differences into focus. I am encouraged to draw a distinction within Buber's Thou by the misgivings expressed 
at least since the second translation of his book regarding the English for the German 'du' in the title of his original.* 
__________  
*Thus distinction is elaborated further elsewhere (Krippendorff, in Press). 
Finally, I am concerned less with facts than with our epistemological blind spots and less with what is wrong than with 
creating compelling possibilities where few existed. Von Foerster (1981) considered it an ethical imperative to always 
increase the number of choices. I have argued for the need to open spaces when constructing human 
communication (Krippendorff, 1989) and suggested the creation of possibilities to be axiomatic for critical 
scholarship (Krippendorff, 1995). In this essay, therefore, I wish to expand the range of possible ways of understanding 
Others through social scientific inquiries. In addition I wish to enable social theorists to enter their domain of observation, 
to encourage researchers to cooperate with those being researched, to grant Others a voice if not the last word on how 
they appear in scientific accounts, and to encourage theories that can develop 'a social Life of their own'. All of these call for 
a radical opening to a new participatory form of inquiry and a dialogical way of knowing. In pursuit of this, I will outline five 
I-Other relations and then explore just three issues: the vulnerabilities of otherness; methodologies appropriate for 
inquiries within these relations; and the social or political roles people are encouraged to play when enacting either of 
these constructions. 
I-They: Statistical aggregates 
They are the subjects in experiments, the interviewees in public opinion polls and the respondents to survey 
questionnaires. They are observed from behind one-way mirrors, assessed by standard measuring instruments, manipulated 
to give analyzable answers. They are also described in terms they cannot contest. For the inquiring I, they are either male 
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or female, black or white, high or low TV-viewers, employed or unemployed, or of a certain IQ. They are not allowed 
to identify themselves, and they have no idea of who looks at them why, how and where. It is this treatment that makes 
them different from us. They are the Others we have nothing in common with. 
Figure 2 They
Statistical aggregates, to be clear, are not only researchers' artifacts, they also are constructed in a particular way. On the 
one hand, by drawing a representative sample of members from a community of people, individuals are selected at random 
and the fabric of their being with each Other, their relatedness, and any evidence of communication is discarded. This 
forced individualization renders people as points in multivariate distributions (Figure 2) whose dimensions primarily are 
the researchers. On the other hand, by describing the properties of the subjects (demographic characteristics, social 
positions, ethnicity, nationality, knowledge, attitudes, preferences, for example) 'objectively', the researchers fail 
to acknowledge their own role in bringing these properties into the open. Although interviews and observations often 
precede such aggregations, this analytical practice effectively erases all evidence of I-they communication as well as of 
the constructed nature of the accounts of 'them'. 
Moreover, measures of aggregates, frequencies, averages, standard deviations, correlations, etc. characterize properties 
of whole aggregates at the expense of their constituent members. In statistical terms, people appear as the passive bearers 
of group characteristics. Indeed, families with 2.5 children do not exist although this may well be the United States average. 
It may be true statistically that women are shorter and physically weaker than men, but demonstrably false in large numbers 
of actual pairs. Similarly, probabilities of diseases do not predict the state of any one inchvidual's health. Statistical 
accounts surrender the properties of individuals to that of conceptual groups. This is what makes'them' different from us. 
I-It: Trivial machines 
Figure 3   A trivial it
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As shown in Figure 3, trivial machines are driven by their inputs. Describing something as a trivial machine is to focus on 
the predictability of its behavior, o, from the conditions that impinge upon it, its input i. This is accomplished by formulating 
a relation between the two observables, ideally in the form of a mathematical function F : o = F(i). Functions do not 
offer choices. They can explain no more than how things respond to their inputs. As far as such machines are concerned, 
inputs are undetermined, open, to be specified by outside events, by their users, by the inquiring I, for example, the I who 
may manipulate them for observable effects. Deviations from the ideal of a mathematical function tend to be explained 
either as variations that unaccountably 'enter' a trivial machine--in communication theory called noise and in 
measurement theory called unreliability--or as breakdowns, that is, as unanticipated and perhaps undesirable changes 
in function. Intentions, agency, creativity, or dialogical practices that largely are responsible for human behavioral 
variations are not part of this vocabulary and hence ruled out. 
Trivial machine conceptions of Others are the backbone of behavioral research. Most social research texts take the 
distinction between independent variables and dependent variables as entirely self-evident and consider the discovery of 
the relations between them as the fundamental empirical problem of science. Commitments to trivial machine 
conceptions provide the researcher the methodological advantage of creating objects of study that are 
observationally determinable, which is to say that their input-output functions are computable from observations. 
Correlation coefficients, for instance, indicate in numerical terms the degree to which any two variables are linearly related, 
the stimuli and responses of an organism, for example. Regression equations express the extent to which predictor 
variables shed light on a chosen criterion, for example the conditions that cause TV viewers to engage in violence. 
Claude Shannon's (1949) information quantifies by how much a system's output is controlled by its inputs. Most of 
these statistics also are measures of the extent to which one is justified treating a system as a trivial machine. As von 
Foerster (1984) already showed, trivial machines occur in many guises: 
  
o = F(i)
Effect = Structure (cause)
Cipher = Code (clear)
Response = Culture (challenge)
Interpretation = Reader (text)
Consumption = (TV viewers) Advertisements
Performance = Actor (script)
Answer = Interviewee (question)
Attitude 
change =
Perception 
(persuasive 
message)
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A current example of the latter is the use of an Elaboration Likelihood Model as a theory of attitude formation. A large 
group of researchers, whose work was extensively reviewed (Craig, 1993) claim attitude change to be describable by 
the function: a' - a = a is(m - a), where a is the initial attitude, a' is the attitude after a message advocating m was received 
and a, i and s are three empirically estimated factors, jointly defining the function. 
Evidently, people are not only describable as trivial machines, they can also be instructed to behave that way, in the 
military, for example, or on assembly lines, as well as in controlled scientific experiments. Such situations are tailor made 
to yield trivial forms of explanation. However, when people happen not to conform to such models, they  are often 
considered unreliable, unruly, or noisy. Upholding trivial machine conceptions as yardsticks for human behavior 
blinds researchers when coming to grips with the human capabilities such conceptions do not permit. 
 I-It: Nontrivial machines 
Nontrivial machines respond not only to inputs, but also to their internal states. Von Foerster (1984), who introduced 
this notion, diagrams their simplest case in terms of inputs i, outputs o, intemal states z, which are related by two functions, 
the driving function F:0=F(i,z), and the (internal) state function G : z' = G (i, z). 
Figure 4 A nontrivial it
A cursory inspection of Figure 4 yields four important properties. First, the internal states of a nontrivial machine 
affect themselves,  which can be seen in the recursive loop involving z. Nontrivial machines can thus be said to maintain a 
life of their own. Second, while the internal states of a nontrivial machine can be interpreted as a kind of repository of 
its history, this internal repository escapes observation. Third, because the behavior of a nontrivial machine results from 
the interaction between their inputs and their internal states, its output o is not predictable from the input i, even after 
extensive observations. Internal states can lay dormant and affect outputs after long periods of time and nontrivial 
machines appear to change their behavior in seemingly unexpected ways. Von Foerster calls their behaviour 
analytically indeterminable. Fourth and finally, nontrivial machines can be built from entirely deterministic and 
trivial components, as indicated by the two defining functions. Von Foerster therefore calls such systems 
synthetically determinable. 
It has been tempting to see certain human qualities in nontrivial machines. Consciousness is certainly recursive. History 
is surely important in people's lives. Human cognition is complex, self-referential and unobservable from the outside. We 
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know how difficult it is to figure out what people are thinking and to predict what they will do, even in everyday 
situations. Interaction between sensation, memory and action is widely assumed and we feel comfortable constructing cognitive 
models on this assumption. Still, none of these common beliefs suggest that humans could be assembled from 
known components. Although medicine has made considerable progress in transplanting organs, the ontogeny of 
humans follows a path that is different from that of artificial mechanisms. Computers are more adequate prototypes 
of nontrivial machines. 
Ross Ashby, one of my teachers, once built an extremely simple nontrivial machine and gave his students the assignment 
to figure out what it does. Each time they thought they had worked out its pattern it showed another surprising move, leading 
to considerable frustration. The next day he showed them the staggering combinatorial possibilities against which they 
were guessing. Von Foerster (1984) computed the number of possible nontrivial machines with only one binary output o 
with values 0 or 1 for n = 1, 2, 3, 4 binary variables i and z. These numbers soon grow beyond practical considerations. For 
one (n = 1) input variable there are fewer than 105 possible machines. For n = 2 there are already nearly 1077, for n = 3 
there are 104002 and for n = 4 there are 1070003. Considering the richness of the human senses and the fact that the human 
brain has about 11 billion unobserved neurons that either fire or rest, understanding humans by observation alone is a 
hopeless undertaking. With the unrealistically small number of inputs in the above example, 1077 is already beyond 
the possibility of systematic exploration. There are not enough atoms on earth to represent these many possibilities. 
Generally, it is a transcomputational task to figure out what nontrivial machines do by observation alone. Von 
Foerster concluded his exploration by saying that 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
'Nontrivial machines are "analytically"
(I prefer "observationally") indeterminable.'
                                                                                                                                                                                               
This states a profound epistemological limit for all inquiries by observation. In fact, Von Foerster's conclusion 
joins Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle, Godel's Incompleteness Theorem and Gill's (statistical) Indeterminacy Principle, 
all of which assert albeit different limits on knowability by observation. 
Unless one is intent to trivialize the world and all the people who populate it with the help of such mechanistic 
descriptions exclusive of the observing I, the most conservative lesson one can derive from the above is that there always 
are far too many equally valid explanations, theories or models of observed behavior to make intelligent selections. 
Their numbers expand hyper-exponentially with increasing numbers of states, shorter histories and smaller proportions 
of variables available to observation. In light of these transcomputational numbers, the probability of selecting an 
observational account that will always yield valid predictions is extremely remote. Sooner or later, nontrivial machines 
seem not to collaborate with their theorists. In practice, that is, within the finite amount of time available for observation 
and analysis, 
nontrivial systems afford
unmanageably many observational accounts.
Whether such accounts are constructed in natural language, in mathematical terms or in the form of computer models, in 
the face of their transcomputational numbers the validity of observational accounts becomes virtually 
unascertainable. Observer capabilities, preferences and institutionalized habits invariably enter. Under these 
conditions compelling stories, rich metaphors or powerful analogues can become attractive alternatives to 
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mathematical accounts,--as evidenced in how we conceptualize and operate our own personal computers. When it comes 
to humans, who have far richer inner lives and capabilities of coping with very different kinds of complexities than those 
that are manifest in machines, the detached observer position leads us into the paradox of being overwhelmed by a 
virtually endless list of logically possible observational accounts while having to dismiss as self-serving, biased or 
unscientific the accounts that people provide about their own experiences. Understanding Others not as structure 
determined (albeit nontrivial) machines, but as linguistically capable beings requires a radically different approach. 
 I-You: Persons in communication 
Third-person accounts locate Others outside a dialogue, often in the monologue of an observing I. Whereas the 
personal pronouns 'he' and , 'she' hold Others in reserved for potential communication, the use of 'it' virtually denies 
its referents personhood and precludes the possibility of meaningful communication. By contrast, second-person 
accounts always refer to people presently talked with and thus add a dimension that could be ignored in I-it accounts: 
language. 'You' occurs in talk among people that are responsive to each Other. Neither the speakers nor the spoken to 
can escape knowing something of each Other. I and You denote persons. Communication between them becomes 
a collaborative effort and inquiries within I-You relations essentially are participatory. As therapists know, observation 
is essential, but dialogue provides the more important key to Others' lives. Indeed, a great deal can be learned about Others 
as well as about selves by getting communicationally involved. 
Conceptions of You and I are always complementary. A mother does not exist without a child. There can be no buyer without 
a seller. Actors and audiences require each Other. And on the behavioral level, a joke needs a teller and Others to laugh 
about it. Complementarity must not be confused with equality, however. Nor does it have anything to do with sharing. It 
simply suggests that roles somehow fit like hand in glove (not like hand in hand) and the difference between them 
is constitutive of a particular relationship. Not all possible pairs of roles fit that way, however. When a senator meets a 
dentist, either the senator becomes a patient, the dentist speaks as a member of the senator's constituency, or they find a 
third way of relating, outside these roles. 
In I-You communication, every I is I's Others' Other. I speaks in the expectation of You's understanding, in the anticipation 
of You's ability to rearticulate what is said in You's own terms, always awaiting I's understanding in turn--all of which 
being manifestly embodied in their intertwined practices--which is the process participants observe and monitor. In 
this recursion, accounts do not reflect I's internal make-up, but I's history and future of interaction with You, including a 
virtual I"s construction of self and Other as well as that virtual I"s construction of a virtual You’s construction of self 
and Other. Thus, in communication, persons become recursively embedded in the enacted accounts of each Other. 
Such accounts not only occur within this relationship, they also constitute it. This understanding moves communication 
far away from notions of 'sending and receiving messages', which may be adequate for conceptualizing how technical 
devices interact with one another, but not for how humans engage each other dialogically, including via 
mediating technologies. The often-feared infinity in this recursive conception should be considered merely an artifact of 
logic. It has hardly ever bothered anyone in practice. We seem to be able to shift between levels of recursion without the 
need to think in many of these levels at any one time (Laing in Miell and Miell, 1986).  
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Figure 5 An 1-You relation
  
Since relational accounts are always constructed in the expectation of being understood, which presupposes 
that communicators have some ability to simulate or ponder their interactions in a space before they are enacted, Figure 
5 suggests that dialogues with Others may be rehearsed before they are enacted into outer dialogues, which in turn can 
affirm or challenge expectations of each Other, of each Other's Other, and so forth, thus braiding each Other's 
reality constructions into each other. In this way, theories of human communication embrace the consequences 
of understanding and enacting them. Erving Goffman's (1959) dramaturgical approach exemplifies the 
complementary construction of persons. The work of R.D. Laing (1967) exemplifies the structural symmetries of 
these constructions. John Shotter (1994) suggests that the notion of an account, as a joint accomplishment, replace the 
non-interactive notion of theory. 
It seems difficult to understand what is going on inside I-You relations without communicative involvements (Roberts 
and Bavelas, in press). What detached observers cannot experience is precisely what makes such a relation real: the 
unfolding history of the particular engagement and the embodied feelings of being in communication. In addition, Jones 
and Nisbett (1972) found 'a pervasive tendency for actors to attribute their actions to situational requirements, 
whereas observers tend to attribute the same actions to stable personality dispositions' (p. 80). In view if this rather 
robust finding, the psychological concept of personality, the stable character of a person, is more likely to be an artifact 
of detached observation rather than an empirical or experiential fact. Sigmund Freud, unaware of how his 
authoritarian relationship to his patients dictated his perceptions, might be said to have built a whole science on this artifact 
of observation, a science that fuelled the by now huge industry of psychoanalytic practices. Now we start to see 
such monological theories as barriers to understanding human communication dialogically. 
Because I-You accounts of communication must account for diverse ways of understanding and enacting them into 
intertwined practices, I and You are not only observationally but also synthetically indeterminate. Neither can we understand 
a You as an isolated individual and from a detached observer's position nor can we compose a You from known parts the 
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way engineers design systems from existing components, precisely because I and You as well as the particular relation 
between them evolve in processes of mutual adjustment. During communicative involvements, nothing is stable except what 
no participant cares to change or all seek to preserve. The empirical fact that we can nevertheless learn quite well of each 
Other while being in communication leads me to say that I and You are 'interactively determinable'. To understand I-
You relations, dialogical involvement is necessary. 
The hitch in this conception of communication lies in the temptation to construct commonalties for I and You almost as in I-
it accounts: a common ground, a common situation, a common language, a common (communication) technology, a 
common culture, a common history, a common code of ethics, a common mission, consensus, or agreement, etc. These 
are logical or technological constructions, not empirical ones, and may take the role of foundations in which everyone is 
to ground their arguments, of overarching superstructures that are alleged to govern the behavior of all participants, or 
of something we are told (by someone) we share, like virtues, vocabularies, biologies or media. This temptation is 
encouraged by the etymology of 'communication'. It shares its stem with 'commonality’, 'community', and 'communion'. 
The everyday conception that communication takes place in a medium and must converge toward consensus as well as the 
idea of eigenvalues as the property of closed systems amount to much the same. Many scientific theories of 
communication have adopted this as their premise, whether they focus on a shared language as Hans Georg Gadamer 
(1975) did and many constructionists do (e.g. Gergen, 1985), on a universal pragmatics as Jürgen Habermas (1970) does, 
or whether they presuppose the existence of a physical medium in which communication is thought of taking place or 
a universe to which the 'content' of communication is supposed to refer. 
Assertions of commonalities can be associated with the exertion of power and with efforts to control dialogical processes. 
For example, rhetorical questions like 'don't we agree on that?', references to '(our) family values', declarations that 'we 
speak the same language' and shared technologies are always constructed by someone who values such commonalities with the 
implicit expectations that Others accept their conception and live with their entailments. By constructing or asserting 
them, commonalties become part of a communication process and accepting their articulations within that process makes 
them real. Only by taking them for granted or completely ignoring how they entered and got hold of the process 
do commonalities acquire the appearance, but only that, of 'objectivity'. One must keep in mind that a we never 
speaks. Individual Is do--but always in continuation of a history of interaction with Others. The authoritative assertion 
of commonalities, while contestable in principle, can easily silence divergent voices and become oppressive. 
The we of claimed commonalities can be seen from exclusive or inclusive perspectives, from a position outside 
that relationship, when an observer describes what they have in common, and from a position inside that relationship, when 
one participating I describes what we share. Either perspective privileges the I that claims to see what Others don't: the I 
that presupposes the standards by which Others are to be judged; the I whose ontological claims everyone is expected to 
accept. A good example that moreover protects I's authority from possible challenges is the claim of hegemony as an 
existing social condition. By Antonio Gramsci's (1987) widely accepted definition, hegemony denotes an all 
pervasive, discursively mediated, and consensual superstructure. In cultural studies, hegemony outdated and replaced the 
older notion of 'ideology', while continuing to depict all those affected, the dominated as well as the dominant, as unable 
to recognize its pervasive presence and its all-embracing power. To avoid the paradox of claiming the ability to see what 
one's theory declares invisible, assertions about 'hegemonic conditions' can be made only from the position of a 
privileged observer who is free of this condition. This places the theorist of hegemony outside the supposed commonality 
and into an I-they relation to those to whom he or she applies the concept. The theory is predicated on constructing Others 
as blind to what I claims able to observe with crystal clarity. In I-You communication, the theory of hegemony is a 
pathological construction in the sense of diminishing Yous, and getting them to be theys. This rhetorically suspect 
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theory becomes blatantly devious when its theorists are aware of the fact that their authority depends on hiding its self-
serving ontology from those they wish to control. By excluding other voices, the concept of hegemony reveals itself 
as 'paternalism' toward Others.  
   
I-Thou: Human beings in conversation 
 Just as in I-You relations, I and Thou denotes a pair of complementary constructions of people characterized by their ability 
to speak for themselves and to create a world of their own, recursively including therein the worlds of Others. However, 
unlike in I-You relations, masks that hide a 'true self', deceptions, representations of Others, no longer have a place. In I-
Thou relations, people constitute themselves in conversational practices: Neither unilaterally imposes its categories on 
the Other. Neither assumes a position superior to the Other. Neither claims to be the agent for a larger whole, the guardian of 
an overriding purpose, or the owner of a universal truth. Stable pattern, even rules of interaction, that could develop 
in conversations nevertheless remain contestable within them. In other words there can be no authority, no reality and 
no commonality that I or Thou could not question. In I-Thou relations human beings are true to themselves (Gadamer, 
1975), authentic (Roberts, 1985), intimate with each Other, and responsible to each Other. Buber (1958) speaks of 
'grace' (p. 11) and of 'love' (p. 14). 
One of the features of I-Thou relations is that the positions of I and Thou are freely interchangeable. This goes 
beyond regarding I as its Other's Other. I and Thou have the ability to take turns in speaking from each Other's 
perspectives, and can shift freely across all complementarities that preserve the qualities of Thou. The kind of power that 
arises with the presumption of non-interchangeability that has no place in I-Thou relations. Roles construed 
as noninterchangeable, for example, male and female, parent and child, therapist and client, or ethnographer and native 
are incommensurate with I-Thou relations. This does not mean that people who see unalterable differences in each Other 
could not participate in I-Thou relations outside these perceptions. I am merely suggesting here that I-Thou relations 
cannot draw on such differences. Serbs and Muslims in former Yugoslavia can get along fine provided neither uses 
their divergent histories as a way of constructing unbridgeable identities. Then, however, they would no longer speak as 
Serbs and as Muslims, but as human beings. At this point conversation is possible. 
If relational practices are contestable in I-Thou conversations, accounts of them must be able to enter these 
conversations, explicitly or implicitly, and circulate freely among the parties involved. Just as in I-You, accounts that re-enter 
I-Thou communication may transform what they speak of and reconstruct the conversational history, the I-Thou relation, 
as well as the very I and Thou that embodies them. However, unlike in I-You, I-Thou accounts must respect each Other's 
being and preserve the possibility of continued conversation. Although this condition would not lend itself to 
formulating accounts of this relation from its outside, Figure 6 offers a sketch of what I mean: Let I' indicate the virtual I 
that observes, conceptualizes and evaluates I's involvement in an I-Thou relation from a position I does not 
momentarily occupy, for example, from its past, its future, or from its Other. This could be seen in Figure 5 as well. Let 
Thou' indicate the equally self-reflecting Thou, I and Thou being in 'view' of or present to each Other-without 
mediation. When I or Thou speak, they always enter their own explicit or implicit accounts of what they see happening into 
an always already ongoing conversation and thus acknowledge each Others' histories, presences, expectations, 
and commitments: Furthermore, let this diagram be the very form of the accounts I' and/or Thou' enter into their 
conversation (from left and right of the diagram). Thus, and not apparent in this figure, accounts of I-Thou relation s 
contain themselves, are recursively self-embedded in the conversational dynamics they unfold and are entirely local if 
not closed to outside interventions.  
  
http://www.asc.upenn.edu/usr/krippendorff/SECORDER.html (12 of 22) [3/7/2008 12:32:15 PM]
Systems Research Vol
Figure 6 An I-Thou relation
Writing of dialogue, Hans-Georg Gadamer (1975) says: 'In human relations the important thing is ... to experience the 
"Thou" truly as a "Thou", i.e. not to overlook [Thou's] claim and to listen to what [Thou] says to us. To this end, openness 
is necessary. ... Without this kind of openness to one another there is no genuine human relationship' (p. 323). I do not 
interpret this to mean that listening could lead to seeing who the Other 'really' is. Gadamer seems to have this in mind. 
All Others occur in I's constructions, as also suggested in Figure 6. Yet, by attentive listening to Thou's voice, by not 
insisting on the exclusive validity of one I's constructions, by not looking for Thou's faults or weaknesses, by not assuming 
that historical trends must continue into the future, by not attempting to persuade or use the other for whatever purpose, in 
other words, by not privileging one's own (naturally more familiar) logic over the logic of one's Others, an I can open itself 
up and reserve a dialogical space for Thou to emerge and be Thouself therein. 
The concept of 'dialogue' is only one logical complement of 'monologue'. I propose 'multilogue' as another. In multi-
logue several distinct possibilities, several incommensurate logics, or several parallel worlds grow side by side. In choosing 
this term I wish to oppose two tendencies toward single world accounts (including of dialogue). First, efforts to 
impose coherences amounts to constructing an overarching metalogic or underlying ground. This would enforce the merger 
of several worlds into one and frustrate multi-logue. Second, in as much as the voices of Others must always be able 
to introduce new perspectives if not entirely new worlds into a conversation, I and Thou has to maintain or 
continuously expand their clearings for listening to each Other, and to invite each Other to enter the open and 
deliberately unstructured spaces in which to meet. In other words, it is the condition of multi-logue that I must preserve 
against the temptation of monological certainties which merely tolerate the logic of Others as derived versions if not 
distortions of I's reality or universe. Being in conversation means continuously creating spaces for the worlds of I and of 
Thou to expand and for both to more around, to make their homes, and be-with each Other. 
Applying his conception of dialogue to Dostoevsky's writing Mikhail Bakhtin (1984) says much the same. 'Monologism, at 
its extreme,' Bakhtin suggests, 'denies the existence outside itself of another consciousness with equal rights and 
equal responsibilities, another I with equal rights [thou]' (p. 292). In the 'homophonic' text, all aspects of narrative 
are subordinated to the will of the author. Others become mere mouthpieces of that author's ideological viewpoints. 
'A monologic ... world does not recognize someone else's thought, someone else's idea, as an object of representation' (p. 
79). By contrast, Dostoevsky does not seek to subordinate or suppress the pervasive vari-directional accents and double 
voiced discourses that characterize the natural milieu of living language; rather, he aims to enhance and encourage 
[a] "dialogically-charged atmosphere" ... This] can be found in the interaction between the hero and the author, the series 
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of "microdialogues" that take place between the various characters, and even the "inner speech" (or "internal dialogue"] 
that occurs within the hero's own self-consciousness. ... [It is only within the polyphonic novel that artistic justice can be 
done to the "objective complexity, contradictoriness and multi-voicedness" of the social world' (Gardiner, 1992). 
Bakhtin (1984) writes:'... a consciousness in Dostoevsky's world is presented not on the path of its own evolution and 
growth, that is, not historically, but rather alongside other consciousness, it can not concentrate on itself and its own idea, 
on the immanent logical development of that idea; instead it is pulled into interaction with other consciousness' (p. 32). I 
would say, several 'logics' unfold in parallel but always in acknowledgment of each Other. In multi-logue, I resists 
the temptation of shaping the voice (and logic of reality) of Others. Instead, I invites the worlds of Others to enter I's 
accounts in ways recognizable by these Others as their very own. Multi-logue necessarily emerges when I and Thou thrive 
on discovering possibilities that neither could imagine by itself,  Multi-logue describes the multiple social realities needed 
for Bakhtin's polyphonic dialogue to not only take place, but also enable their participants to move out of burdensome if 
not oppressive relational practices (Krippendorff, 1995). 
As Buber suggested, I-Thou relations are informed by love--not love of someone, but love of the multi-faceted (to which I 
want to add unmediated) otherness that creates and complements the I, the feeling of being in sync with Others' 
understanding and of appreciating the diversity of otherness that love makes possible. 'Love is between I and Thou...' 'Love 
is the responsibility of an I for a Thou' (Buber, 1958, pp.14-15). Celebrating the Other as Edward Sampson (1993) suggests is 
a start but may not be enough. The construction of a Thou in a world that may be radically different if not incommensurate 
with ones own yet occupiable as well opens the possibility for I to see itself through an Other's (Thou's) eyes.* 
__________________________  
* Although I used this metaphor in a 1984 version of this paper, I was pleased to learn that the Austrian Therapist Victor Frankl 
already used it the same kind of circular construction (Foerster, 1991).  
  
Comparisons 
The following table summarizes some of the consequences of distinguishing among the five I-Other relations developed 
above. I will travel through these in three respects: the vulnerability of otherness; methodological issues of inquiring 
into Others; and political consequences of different Other-constructions, and leave further explorations to the reader. 
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Vulnerabilities of othernesses 
To show their vulnerability, that is, how easily one kind of otherness can erode into another, the five relations 
distinguished above may be seen as ordered. Clearly, accounts of they in I-they relations tend to be most stable as Others 
are precluded from providing feedback on I's conceptualizations. By contrast, for I and Thou everything is 
examinable, contestable, but also always incomplete from any one's perspective. The spaces for I and Thou to be with 
each Other expand and this always entails an element of mutual unpredictability. I therefore take the construction of 
human beings in I-Thou relations as the prototypical case from which all, the other forms of otherness are derivable 
by introducing constraints. 
Starting from the Thou that I faces in conversation, I am suggesting, as soon as an I tries to keep Others in the places I 
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wants them to occupy, as soon as this I refuses to let Others speak from positions of their choice, for example, by 
claiming superiority, better equipment, more knowledge, or the ability to understand Thou better than Thou does, as soon as 
I-Thou conversation becomes restricted by a technology or third party rules, the I-Thou relation degrades into an I-You 
relation in which such inequities can make their home and noninterchangeable identities may settle in. As soon as I 
claims unilateral access to what I and Thou are said to share, a common ground, purpose, history or consensus, etc., or as 
soon as I insists on dictionary definitions, consistency, rationality or conformity to a general theory of human nature, 
without Thou's consent, Thou ceases to exist. For example, when lovers start examining the costs and benefits of being in 
that relation, keep a tab on how many favors each gave the Other, or play 'tit for tat', rational rules of conduct emerge and 
the relationship of love transforms itself into an economic one where a common currency matters (Solomon, 1990). 
Although I-Thou relations seem to be most vulnerable, all human relations may erode. When the I in an I-You relation 
takes the position of a detached observer who denies those observed a voice in I's constructions, or when people are assigned 
to serve particular functions, whether as employees or as enemies, then this I starts using its Others as instances of categories 
or as tools. Since these conditions do not grant it / they respect, the inquiring I will have no reasons to talk and listen to 
it / them, nor to negotiate with it / them an identity suitable to each Other. When You erodes into it / they, the dialogue of 
two-way communication retreats into the monologue of one-way communication. Denying Others their agency opens the 
ways to describing them as structurally, situationally or historically determined nontrivial entities. Furthermore, denying 
the importance of internal processes, histories or dispositions reduces them further to trivial stimulus-response mechanisms 
that merely react to messages or to whatever they face: answering questions, watching TV advertisements, and 
obeying instructions. Finally, generalizing away individual differences and grouping them into homogeneous classes 
creates the collective 'they' of people whose identity fades into I's categorizations. 
In the domain of interpersonal relations, Mary Roberts (1985) reports similar vulnerabilities, When her subjects held I-
it conceptions involving their partners, it was virtually impossible for them to engage in I-Thou relationships. Such 
subjects could not even comprehend accounts of more intimate ways of relating to Others, much less venturing into 
such relations. They remained stuck in I-it world constructions and (mistreated their partners as servants or as 'doormats', as 
she said, seemingly closed to their partner's conceptions, and unable to take responsibilities for their part in the 
unfolding dynamics between them. However, if subjects could understand accounts of I-Thou relations, they could 
envision being in such relationships and become aware when their partner turned out not to live up to these expectations. I 
have met many who had great difficulties seeing Others as living in worlds different from their own and far more that found 
it impossible to see themselves through these different Others' eyes. I am suggesting this to be even more difficult in 
social inquiries. 
Buber (1958) has seen the vulnerability of Thou as well but differently. He considers love as being focused on whole 
human beings. Hate, he says, is always limiting, focusing on parts of Others which takes Thou into components (that have 
no agency by themselves). Hating the whole person transforms the Thou to the it of an object (pp. 16-17). Apparently, not 
only can human relations easily erode in careless practices, they may no longer be recoverable. 
Methodological implications 
Walking through this ordering of othernesses from the other direction, reveals as myth that we could understand Others 
by moving from simple components to complex systems--much as we build machines. In population statistics, I 
suggested, relational phenomena have no place. Communication, if it happens to be practiced between the sampled members 
of a population, is completely unrecognizable in psychological accounts of them. In monological constructions of Others 
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(they and it), dialogical processes, processes that are at least in part informed by the inquiring I's interactive involvement 
with You or Thou, have no place. Also, a Thou cannot be experienced by people who see Others in terms of functions 
and social roles. I contend that the great amount of 'unaccounted variation' or 'noise' that social scientific data are said to 
be plagued by is only partially due to the inability, if not unwillingness, of researchers to take more complex data, 
narratives, dialogues and conversations into account. Far more important, however, is the researchers' fear of leaving 
their authority-conferring and secure detached observer or engineering roles and stepping into less unilaterally 
controllable, participatory and dialogical practices. 
More specifically, our well-worn scientific methods of analyzing observational data favor statistical and deterministic 
or mechanistic models and thus trivialize people. As soon as objects of scientific inquiries are nontrivial, observational 
methods lose their power. The virtual impossibility to select with some meaningful degree of certainty among the 
many conceivable models, theories or accounts one that will stay valid questions the detached observer role as well as 
the related representational notion of truth. Under nontrivial conditions, researchers have to become builders of what they 
seek to understand. However, inquiries by synthesis encounter their own limitations when confronted by persons who can 
not be taken apart and reassembled. Human cognition is not only pliable, but also nearly inaccessible to observation 
outside communicative interventions by Others. To inquire into persons as knowledgeable communicators and as 
active constituents of social realities, researchers cannot avoid becoming personally involved in co-creating the 
very complementary social realities they seek to understand, but now without unilateral control. I-You accounts that 
are accepted or rearticulated by Others become constitutive of the very reality they assert and interactively determine 
the behavior of these Others as much as that of the inquiring I. Such accounts are dialogical, not propositional. Although 
the very intent of researchers to inquire into Others contradicts I-Thou relations, I suggest that no method of inquiry 
should claim to be unquestionable by those inquired into and thus preclude the possibility of Thou. 
Taking inquiry as a relational practice challenges the troubling representational notion of truth in yet another way. As 
a property of propositions about a nonlinguistic world this notion of truth assumes that language is not part of the world 
it describes. This makes it difficult for theoretical considerations to address much of what people do: talking, 
reflecting, theorizing themselves and Others, that is, languaging. When the objects of inquiry are remotely nontrivial, 
an awareness of the researchers' linguistic contributions becomes indispensable and shifts attention from the 'truths 
of propositions' to 'the making of truth claims.' Such a shift has invited all kinds of criticisms, largely under the umbrella 
of observer, ideological or social biases which operate within the representational notion of truth. This does not go far 
enough, however. When truth claims concern people who can claim their own truths, their acceptance is no longer a matter 
of avoiding biases but of being viable in communication among stake holders, of providing social benefits, and of 
constructing social realities for constituents to Live in. This speaks for a dialogical truth and against a propositional one. 
I would say that all scientific propositions, theories and accounts--even those denying their relational nature--stay alive 
in networks of communication and are accepted by people (scientists) because of what they mean to them. In I-they relations, 
I suggest that accounts are accepted when they provide information about human population characteristics of interest to 
those with large-scale supervisory or surveillance needs. A survey, for example, that fails to provide relevant 
information means nothing, regardless of its propositional truth. I-trivial it accounts preserve the instrumentality of Others, 
and I-nontrivial it accounts preserve their rational substitutability. The classical criteria of 'prediction' and 'control' tie 
scientists to instrumental conceptions and the criterion of substitutability tie them to technology. Criteria in I-You relations 
are again quite different. Having to survive contestations, rearticulations and reenactments in communication, I-You 
accounts end up preserving the very complementary social realities that their constituents are willing to live in. In I-
Thou accounts, informativeness, manipulability, serviceability and viability within communication hardly matter, but 
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the preservation of the possibilities of conversation is critical. Relational criteria of this kind not only provide a 
more differentiated vocabulary of reasons for accepting propositions, theories, models or accounts of Others we inquire 
into, but also are closer to actual communication practices than the decontextualized claims of propositional truths. 
Relational criteria also redefine problems of establishing knowledge. In I-they, I seems to resolve classificatory uncertainties 
by objectifying social stereotypes exclusive of I. In I-trivial it, classifications are less important than I's ability of 
successful manipulation. What matters in I-nontrivial it is I's ability of constructing serviceable Others, substituting 
or expanding on human capabilities. In I-You, understanding manifests itself in I's ability to dialogically, reflexively 
and creatively participate with Others, in complementarily constructing social realities. In I-Thou, understanding 
means bootstrapping oneself in the presence of the radical otherness of Others and maintaining the possibility of 
co-emancipation. 
Political consequences of various I-Other accounts 
The final question I want to address concerns the political implications of these five ways of knowing Others. The above 
might give the impression that my concern is interpersonal. This is not so. All social scientists ultimately face their 
subjects, however superficial this may be. All social scientists also publish their theories and involve themselves in 
discourses through which their accounts acquire currency. Finally, all social scientific accounts can re-enter the social 
fabrics they describe, mobilize opposition, intervene in existing social practices, create or destroy social realities, become 
a political matter, and maintain or encourage certain societal forms and associated citizenships to emerge. I will comment 
on these. 
Most obviously, knowledge gained from statistically aggregated population characteristics provides convenient overviews 
of large populations from superior (or objective) perspectives. This kind of knowledge effectively supports the large-
scale surveillance of populations and, when published, offers individuals a way to orient themselves, but only in the 
surveyors categories. What may start as a purely statistical artifact can become real as people learn of their class 
memberships and act on their alleged group properties. Being couched in scientific terms, people may surrender 
their conceptual abilities to how these accounts depict them. This benefits social institutions that thrive on such conceptions 
of social reality. 
Through the massive re-entry of population statistics the methodological distinction between intellectually superior 
scientific observers and synthetic aggregates of (skillfully constrained, purposefully disabled, and methodologically 
inferior) Others comes to be reproduced in the social distinction between superior users of statistical generalizations and 
the masses of cultural dupes that occur in these accounts. Oscar Gandy (1993) has analyzed the political economy 
of automating this knowledge in the form of increasingly sophisticated electronic surveillance systems that remain 
essentially hidden from view. The social use of this kind of knowledge nourishes a mass 'democracy' that is governed not 
so much by individually responsible political actors, but by large institutions, governments, as well as corporations, 
who command the instruments for large-scale surveillance. 
Accounting for people as trivial machines structurally equates them with technical devices and easily manipulable 
tools. Knowledge of this kind finds its uses wherever there is a need for performing functions on command, 
reliably, mechanically, automatically and without reflection. Sciences whose methodologies produce trivial theories of 
Others cannot help but deliver humans into the hands of those with access to their inputs and interest in their outputs: the 
mass media, marketing or the insurance industry, for example. Such an accounting supports a society whose organizing idea 
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is to serve social functions--as articulated by structural-functionalism in sociology. 
Theorizing people in terms of nontrivial machines can at least in part be linked to unprecedented advances in 
computer technology which informed this conception in the first place. The fascination with such machines fuels 
technological developments generally, including efforts to find technical solutions to human and social problems. 
Computer metaphors for explaining human behavior in terms of information processing, cognition, computation and control 
are spreading and have created such disciplines as computational linguistics and artificial intelligence. Studying humans 
with the help of nontrivial models, finding technologies that mimic them, leads not so much to the human use of Others 
as tools, but to their systematic displacement by technical devices deemed more efficient. We should remind ourselves that 
in the 18th and 19th century, computers were humans who could calculate with paper and pencil. Now such referents 
are unheard of. The very claim that contemporary computers are faster, able to store more information, and operate 
more reliably than humans do attests to the prevailing practice of considering humans as flawed by comparison to 
nontrivial machines. Such inquiries have systematically retarded the understanding of non-mechanical human contributions 
to society. Celebrating algorithms at the expense of the infinitely more complex human interactions nourishes a conception 
of society as a reliable technology that we and Others are to serve This kind of understanding Others is not 
merely instrumental, it promotes a universal technological rationality we are asked to apply to everyday life. 
Unlike technical devices, persons speak to each Other, live in stories told to each Other, construct themselves in discourses 
and participate in different publics. Their roles are not fixed, but continually negotiated and articulated in communication 
and in contrast to each Other. 
Knowledge of I and of You is highly situation specific, mutually recognizable, rearticulable and public. Theories that are 
both of and debated within such public relationships are literally political in nature. To be political means to acknowledge 
each Other's roles as speakers and listeners, to cognize each Other's conceptualizations, to know whose facts and 
opinions matter, to evaluate what is said and done as being motivated by interests and responding to what absent members 
of one's community have said, or are thought to think and expected to do. Others in this society are citizens by the 
classical definition. 
However, in this political form of society, the assumption that communication (by its received definition) must 
converge toward mutual understanding or conserve its medium provides a hidden lever for the (often institutionalized) I 
that asserts such common grounds and thus remains in charge of the political realities that can grow on it. This 
fundationalism, mostly unnoticed and unquestioned, provides the hidden support for political institutions to develop and thrive. 
Political institutions become oppressive when they act to preserve the unquestionableness of their foundations. A society 
in which people can contest its foundations, question its authorities and reflect on whatever creates barriers to 
open conversation can be called emancipatory. This is a society in which Others are respected as human beings, as Thou, 
in which the diversity of otherness is encouraged, and multi-logue is practiced. This society will continuously expand 
the possibilities for self and Others to be with each Other and move on. Preserving the possibility of Thou, the possibility 
of multi-logical world constructions and the possibility of dialogue between diverse people may be the most 
important contribution social scientists could make, even if this possibility resides only in small groups and persists for 
short periods of time. 
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